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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Fear and loathing 
With more than two years to go before the next scheduled presidential election in 
Russia, it is disconcerting that the campaign to select the next president has hit a 
fever pitch so soon, but the jockeying for position (and profits) is unmistakable.  
Whether it’s the more familiar smear campaigns of prosecutorial investigations 
into corruption, or the sniping between the Defense Minister and Procurator-
General, or even the more extreme—and yet not unheard of—possible 
assassination attempt on Anatoli Chubais, the signs of a succession struggle 
abound.  (1) 
 
There are several layers to this struggle, some of which are a direct result of 
Russia's unfinished transition:  With the governing ideology still an unstable mesh 
of democratic, authoritarian and socialist elements, there is a continuing sense 
that the "soul" of the state is still at risk; the elite clans, easily identifiable in the 
Yel'tsin era and throughout much of the Putin administration, are disintegrating 
as personal ambition—political and financial—disrupts the allegiances of onetime 
political expediency. There is a foreign factor as well, the perception of western 
involvement in the Orange, Rose and Tulip revolutions has added that dash of 
paranoia, which exacerbates all the other trends. 
 
For years, the "Young Turk" reformers of the Yel'tsin era clung to state power 
under the banner of creating, and then securing, private ownership as the 
foundation of Russia's renunciation of its Soviet past.  The creation of oligarchic 
power and influence, which sprung from the methods chosen by some of these 
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Young Turks, was partially reversed in the first surge of the Putin administration.  
(It is, at the very least, arguable that there is a qualitative difference between the 
practice of allowing private businessmen to profit from sketchy government 
auctions and then appointing them to powerful political positions, and the 
consequence of Putin's actions, which disentangled several "oligarchs" from the 
overt levers of public administration, but allowed political figures and 
administrative elites to enter the private sector through oversight and ownership 
of the very businesses confiscated from the last administration's pet financiers.) 
 
Putin's awkward response to the attack at Beslan, which included the 
controversial "reforms" of the legislature and negation of elections of regional 
leaders, demonstrates quite vividly the clash of authoritarianism and democracy 
in Russia.  While his changes will proceed, as long as Putin insists that they do, 
the clamor over the reversal of democratic choice in the regions has 
demonstrated a large pool of discontent. 
 
Disappointment and frustration with the regime were perhaps most evident this 
year in the clash over the monetization of benefits.  A largely economic and 
budget-driven decision to convert state benefits was reversed in a number of 
sectors (most notably the military) due to the widespread protests.  Whether 
these decisions and their consequences amount to a clash of economic 
ideologies, or rather a response to the state's continuing inability to meet the 
population's expectations, is an open question.  
 
While much time and ink (band width?) has been spent in the demarcation of 
clans within the Putin Kremlin, most notably the emigration from St. Petersburg 
and the rise of the siloviki, the winds of political change threaten to disrupt the 
apparent bonds of clan loyalty.  It has suddenly become more fruitful to 
determine who sits with whom on what board of directors and what mergers are 
allowed to proceed, rather than how many years one spent with the services or 
how well one knew Sobchak. 
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It is, however, the element of fear over potential foreign intervention in the 
electoral process that magnifies the levels of discontent in the country (powerful 
and populace), draws potential political contenders into open struggle, and adds 
urgency to the apparat maneuvers to secure their "portfolios" before the dreaded 
political and economic restructuring believed to be inevitable in a post-Putin 
Russia. 
 
In her attempts to understand apparat responses to possible political challengers 
to Putin (who, it should be remembered, is not eligible to run in 2008), Yulia 
Latynina developed an understanding of the anxiety over western involvement in 
Russian politics among the Kremlin elite:  "The United States cares about nothing 
else but selecting Russian presidents.  The Americans are preoccupied by that 
for 23.5 hours a day, with the remaining half hour spent on toppling Lukashenko." 
(2) 
 
Walking together with our own Putin people 
The first manifestations of the Putin administration's flirtations with a "cult of 
personality" were awkward:  Youth in colored t-shirts with Putin's face 
emblazoned on them, cheering at rallies or marching through Moscow; a pop 
song extolling the virtues of Vladimir Vladimirovich; book burnings by nervously 
intense young Russians.   It had all of the potential for idol worship, but little of 
the follow through.  
 
Older and perhaps wiser, some of the leaders and members of the early Putin 
fan clubs have created a new movement, Nashi (Our Own).  (3)  While their 
foundational meetings were intriguing, it is their recent summer camp that has 
sparked real interest.  
 
The event, titled "Seliger 2005" for its proximity to Lake Seliger (north of 
Moscow), reportedly was attended by 3,000 activists and featured guest 
 4 
speakers including some of the Kremlin's most influential denizens:  Deputy Chief 
of Staff Vladislav Surkov, spin doctor/ideologist Gleb Pavlovsky and State Duma 
Deputy Andrei Kokoshin, among others.  Surkov's comments were particularly 
pointed, as he vowed to "hand over the country" to the Nashi youth and called on 
the activists "to protect the youth from Western influence." (4) 
 
The camp initially appeared as an open-air education program with a strong 
element of discipline (attendees forego alcohol and cursing, instead participating 
in daily runs and informative lectures), but the armed guards patrolling the 
perimeter and high-profile guests soon drew attention to the gathering.  (5)  
 
The day after the Seliger 2005 camp concluded, Nashi activists (the commissars) 
were invited to an audience with Putin at Zavidovo.  (Putin had been scheduled 
to speak at the camp but evidently was unable to attend.)  In addition to lauding 
the group for their "example of civil society," Putin provided the acolytes with a 
meal and posed for photographs. (6) 
 
Nashi managed to turn out a reported 60,000 marchers for the Victory Day 
celebrations in May, and is reputed to be "managed by 3,000 federal commissars 
from 30 regions in central Russia." (7)  The reality of that regional base is yet to 
be tested. 
 
Nashi has its share of critics too, of course. Federation Council Speaker Sergei 
Mironov describes the organization's activists as "ideological wolves who could 
become unmanageable."  (8)   That is certainly one of the many dangerous 
possibilities. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) See Previous NIS Observed for details of the recent clashes between apparat 
figures, military elites and other "interested parties" in the upcoming elections. 
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(2) "The Dachas of Evidence," Novaya gazeta, No. 54, 28 Jul 05; Agency What 
the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) See previous NIS Observed for details on the creation of Nashi. 
(4)  "Nashi Youth Group to Inherit the Nation," by Anna Arutunyan and Oleg 
Liakhovich, Moscow News 20 Jul 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) "Putin Intercepts Our Own," Vedomosti, 27 Jul 05; Agency WPS via Lexis-
Nexis. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Maolmordha McGowan 
 
Terrorists on TV 
Shamil Basayev’s appearance in a pre-taped interview on ABC’s ‘Nightline’ with 
Radio Liberty reporter Andrei Babitsky drew an irate response from the Kremlin: 
It culminated in a Ministry of Foreign Affairs announcement that the mandatory 
accreditation for ABC journalists in Russia would not be extended. Defense 
Minister Ivanov labeled ABC as ‘persona non grata’ in Russia. (1) 
 
An embarrassment, a rivalry, poor word choice or precedent? 
While deriding ABC News for broadcasting the propaganda of a self-proclaimed 
terrorist, Russian authorities refused to acknowledge an embarrassing reality—
that this lone Russian-born journalist gained a private audience with Basayev at 
his hideout. After years of effort, the FSB, MVD and the GRU have all failed to 
detain or destroy Basayev, despite Putin’s promise to “find terrorists... in the 
outhouse.” (2)  Perhaps this underlying embarrassment was the trigger for 
Moscow’s recent vindictive behavior. 
 
Basayev seems entirely willing to provide fuel for the fire of public anger and 
indignation, identifying himself in the terms that FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev 
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or MVD Chief Rashid Nurgaliev themselves have used. “I admit, I’m a bad guy. A 
bandit, a terrorist.” He also warns that incidents like the Beslan massacre could 
occur again, as long as the “genocide of the Chechen nation 
continues…anything can happen.” (3)  Stalin himself could not have described a 
more perfect enemy of the state. 
 
Whatever the impact of such an interview on public opinion or support for Kremlin 
policies, there is another factor in the decision to oust ABC: The Kremlin's 
assumption that all foreign reporting is an expression of official foreign 
government policy. Thus, as Kommersant has reported, the Kremlin reacts as if 
ABC is operating as a mouthpiece for the U.S. administration, and that the 
broadcast is further evidence of the deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations. (4) 
 
The fact that Babitsky reports also for Radio Liberty, an organization that 
receives some U.S. government funding, bolsters this approach. For his part, 
Babitsky has stated that he never intended to interview Basayev for Radio 
Liberty. He insists that while on vacation from the network, he traveled to 
Chechnya to interview a Basayev associate; instead he was masked and taken 
to Basayev himself. (5)  Pundits interviewed by RIA Novosti argued that the 
interview might have been conducted intentionally, but proved "too hot" for Radio 
Liberty, and therefore was pitched to ABC. (6)  The Kremlin's distorted view of 
the relationship between the state and the media in the U.S. has been evident 
previously, but the Putin administration's inability, or resistance, to understand 
this separation of roles increases the likelihood of misperceptions and conflicts. 
 
Leaving aside the foreign relations ramifications, Russian anger might just as 
easily have sprung from the title for the online version of the story: “Chechen 
Guerilla Leader Calls Russians ‘Terrorists’.” (7)  The idea that a reputable news 
institution would refer to Basayev as a guerilla and the Russians as terrorists is 
viewed as ludicrous. Basayev calls himself a terrorist, why won’t ABC? Bolshoi 
Gorod editor Masha Gessen holds that the Kremlin’s punishment of a foreign 
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news agency should be seen as a more general warning to all journalists against 
covering the Chechen conflict in terminology other than those sanctioned by the 
government. (8)  Currently, journalists in Chechnya must register with the 
Ministry of Defense, which invariably limits their freedom of movement and 
content. Punishing ABC would serve to reestablish this precedent. 
 
Or, perhaps, something more personal… 
Andrei Babitsky, and his coverage of Chechnya in particular, has been 
controversial throughout the Putin regime. Babitsky’s reporting has been a 
primary source of evidence for those foreign governments and NGOs that have 
accused the military and security agencies of violating human rights in 
Chechnya. 
 
While attempting to travel to Beslan to cover the school siege, he was detained 
by the MVD and accused of attempting to carry explosives onto a plane, then 
arrested for "hooliganism" after being provoked into a fight with two unidentified 
men. (9)  Gazeta reported that he was detained in Dagestan in 2000 after he 
reportedly attempted to cross the border using a fake passport. (10)  Novaya 
gazeta recalled that he was “abducted” by the FSB in Chechnya that same year, 
and after interrogation over a charge of aiding terrorists, was released in what 
seems to have been a staged prisoner exchange for Russian servicemen. [11] 
Clearly, the Kremlin would like Babitsky neutralized, and this incident has 
provided the Kremlin with a passable excuse to ban him from Russia. 
 
…or something much more complicated 
It would not be unfair to say that Shamil Basayev provides a useful scapegoat for 
the deteriorating situation in the Caucasus. One might say that there is a certain 
symbiotic relationship between the security services and Shamil Basayev which 
boils down to the following: Basayev did it. With every fresh attack in Russia, 
Basayev either claims responsibility, is held responsible by the security services, 
or both. Hardly an incident occurs, large or small, that is not attributed to 
 8 
Basayev in some way. While he remains free to operate against Russian 
elements in the Caucasus, it is probably also true that he has little to do with the 
day-to-day operation of terrorist activities in Russia. Yet, he is still held 
responsible. 
 
The Kremlin knows this reality. It has thus become clear that the Russian 
authorities are intent on presenting their war on terrorism as one against a 
mastermind and his organization, rather than an idea. Ideas have a way of 
dodging bullets. 
 
Consider Rasul Makasharipov, who was the most wanted man in Dagestan until 
he was killed during a raid by Dagestani MVD troops on July 6, reportedly, in his 
own home. (12)  Makasharipov had become a regional celebrity, both claiming 
and being assigned responsibility by local MVD authorities for nearly all of the 
anti-Russian violence in Dagestan. Yet even as the announcement of this victory 
was being made, another bombing occurred in Makhachkala, the Dagestani 
capital. (13) 
 
Putin traveled to Dagestan the following week, in secret, due to security 
concerns. (14)  Attacks occur there on a nearly daily basis. The destruction of 
this one man seems to have had little effect. 
 
Still, the security services persist with a policy of "lone attribution." Shamil 
Basayev may be such a "good enemy" for the security services and the military, 
that it might be too risky for them to kill him. It is no secret that many involved in 
running the campaign in the Caucasus would like it to continue indefinitely, since 
these corrupt officials are drowning in floods of Moscow’s money. 
 
However, even if the security services wanted to win the war, they might have a 
harder time with Basayev gone. After all, they killed Aslan Maskhadov, the man 
the FSB claimed was his partner in crime and co-leader of the terrorists. The 
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security situation in the Caucasus has only deteriorated since. If they kill Basayev 
and the violence continues, what explanation will the security services have? 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Kommersant, 4 Aug 05 via 
http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?id=598532. 
(2) AFP, 31 Dec 99 via 
http://asia.dailynews.yahoo.com/headlines/world/article.html?s=asia/headlines/99
1231/world/afp/Putin_rocked_Russians_with_ruthlessness.html. 
(3) Nightline Online, 29 Jul 05 via 
http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/International/story?id=990187&page=1. 
(4) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 Aug 05; WPS via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) Novaya gazeta, 4 Aug 05; WPS via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) RIA Novosti, 8 Aug 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) Nightline, ibid. 
(8) Moscow Times, 4 Aug 05 via 
http://www.moscowtimes.ru/stories/2005/08/04/006.html. 
(9) The Moscow Times, 6 Sep 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(10) Gazeta, 1 Aug 05, What the Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis. 
(11) Novaya gazeta, 28 Jan 05; WPS 31 Jan 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(12) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 8 Jul 05, WPS via Lexis-Nexis. 
(13) Ibid. 
(14) The Moscow Times, 18 Jul 05 via 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/07/18/001.html. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Rebecca Mulder 
 
The Finnish example 
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At President Putin's recent meeting with Finnish President Tarja Halonen. The 
official agenda included travel rules between Russia and the E.U., forestry, high 
technology, innovation and common border arrangements. This followed the 
Russia-E.U. summit, where decisions were made regarding the “road map” for 
the creation of the “four common spaces,” and the Northern Dimension Initiative. 
The latter, a program aimed at balancing the development of southern and 
northern Europe and making use of the abundance of natural resources in 
northern Russia, was initiated by the E.U. in September 1997 and became official 
E.U. strategy in June 1999.  Finland assumes the rotating E.U. presidency in the 
second half of 2006 and Halonen stated that E.U.-Russian cooperation and the 
Northern Dimension Initiative would be key elements of the E.U. agenda. (1) 
 
Alexander Yakovenko, spokesman for Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated 
that Russian-Finnish relations are strong, with an emphasis on favorable 
economic development and greater competitiveness within their national 
economies. He added that investment opportunities have increased and Russia 
is third in Finnish foreign trade. (2)  Putin expressed his reservation concerning 
the admission of Estonia and Latvia into the E.U. and raised once more the issue 
of Russian speakers in the two countries: “The modern law system in all 
developed countries has common approaches. There are basic notions: citizen, 
foreigner, a stateless person and a person with dual citizenship. Our partners in 
the Baltics invented a new notion – non-citizen. This does not exist in any other 
country.” (3) Yakovenko added that Finland, a nation of rich democratic 
traditions, “which make it possible for all the people permanently resident in the 
country to participate in municipal elections irrespective of citizenship…can serve 
as a good example for Riga and Tallin.” (4)  Halonen, however, disagreed with 
these assessments of the situation in the Baltic republics and stated that the 
matter will not be a priority during Finland’s E.U. presidency. 
 
Indeed, Finland, Estonia and the E.U. have shown interest in minority rights 
issues within Russia, namely the status of the Finno-Urgic peoples related to 
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Finns and Estonians. Vladislav Surkov, Deputy Head of Putin’s presidential 
administration chose to interpret this interest as geopolitical in nature, 
supposedly because of the oil-rich location in which these ethnic minorities 
reside. (5)  The issues mentioned are likely to remain contentious. Other matters 
generating friction between Moscow and Helsinki concern Finland’s support of 
the Baltics’ position on border treaties with Russia, their demand that Russia 
recognize that they were forcibly annexed, and concern that the expansion of 
Russian oil tanker and port facilities to increase energy export in the Baltic Sea 
region could endanger the ecological security of the area. 
 
No peace treaty needed 
Presidential Envoy in the Far East Federal District Konstantin Pulikovsky recently 
stated that no peace treaty ending WWII is needed between Russia and Japan, 
and, therefore, no resolution of the dispute over the Kuril Islands (the Northern 
Territories) is necessary. Pulikovsky remarked, “The problem of the so-called 
Northern Territories is more of a PR platform for election campaigns of Japanese 
politicians. This is their domestic affair, which does not concern Russia.” (6)  
Moreover, he claimed that, in any case, relations were fairly strong in the 
economic and tourist spheres. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also 
stressed that the absence of a peace treaty has not hampered varied bilateral 
cooperation. (7)  Russia continues to acknowledge the territorial problem with 
Japan but rejects Japan’s demand that the four Kuril islands be returned. 
 
Russia’s rejection of a peace treaty and its unwillingness to make any 
concessions to Japan are likely to harm future relations, however friendly or 
economically advantageous Russia asserts that they might be. Without an 
attractive scenario for large-scale investment, Russia may not be able to secure 
Japanese interest. China's status in the region could prove to be a very dynamic 
force as well. Russia’s dismissive attitude towards Japanese concerns is likely to 
affect future relations between them. 
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The North Korean problem 
The first stage of the fourth round of the six-party talks involving North and South 
Korea, the United States, Japan, China and Russia were held in Beijing, July 26-
August 7.  Aleksandr Aleksayev, head of the Russian delegation, said that 
whether the new round of negotiations would yield any positive results depended 
largely on the outcome of bilateral consultations between North Korea and the 
United States, which seeks a mutually acceptable way to bring about a nuclear-
free Korean peninsula. (8) Talks are scheduled to resume in late August or early 
September, giving delegates time to come up with acceptable solutions between 
now and then. China continues to play the leading role in these talks but whether 
its influence leads to denuclearization by North Korea remains to be seen. 
 
“Imperialism” in Cuba 
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s recent announcement of the creation 
of a post responsible for preparing a change of power in Cuba (“Cuba Transition 
Coordinator”) sparked a vehement response from Karen Khachaturov, head of 
the Russian Committee for Cooperation with Latin America: “This is another anti-
Cuban gesture and a demonstration by U.S. authorities of their extreme hostility 
to their island neighbor, the victim of almost 50 years of unjust trade sanctions.” 
(9) 
 
Attack in Poland 
Four high school pupils of the Russian Embassy in Poland were attacked and 
severely beaten by about fifteen Polish teenagers in a Warsaw park. Russian 
officials assert the attack is connected to anti-Russian sentiments in Poland, 
“recently fueled by politicians’ unfriendly statements.” (10)  A spokesman with the 
Russian Foreign Ministry stated, “The responsibility for the current situation in 
bilateral relations rests with the Polish authorities.” (11)  A demand was made to 
the Polish ambassador that Polish authorities carry out a thorough inquiry into 
the matter, finding and punishing those guilty, and compensating the injured 
parties. Russia expects official apologies from Poland. (12) 
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Source Notes: 
 
(1) RIA Novosti, 2 Aug 05, 17:11 (GMT) via 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20050802/41076196-print.html. 
(2) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 1 Aug 05, “Alexander 
Yakovenko, Spokesman of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Answers Media 
Questions Regarding Russian-Finnish Relations” via http://www.ln.mid.ru. 
(3) RIA Novosti, 2 Aug 05, 14:23 (GMT) via 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20050802/41074385-print.html. 
(4) Ibid., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 Aug 05 via http://www.ln.mid.ru. 
(5) Eurasia Daily Monitor, 5 Aug 05, vol. 2, issue 153 via www.jamestown.org. 
(6) RIA Novosti, 2 Aug 05, 14:15 (GMT) via 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20050802/41074354-print.html. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) RIA Novosti, 1 Aug 05, 19:21 (GMT) via 
http://en.rian.ru/world/20050801/41069735-print.html. 
(9) RIA Novosti, 1 Aug 05, 14:38 (GMT) via 
http://en.rian.ru/society/20050801/41066899-print.html. 
(10) RIA Novosti, 1 Aug 05, 19:05 (GMT)via 
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20050801/41069651-print.html. 
(11) Ibid. 
(12) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 1 Aug 05, “Statement 
by Boris Malakhov, Deputy Spokesman of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Regarding Attack on Children of Russian Embassy Officials in Warsaw” via 
www.ln.mid.ru. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
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Putin, NGOs, the press, and the Public Chamber 
The "Law on the Public Chamber" went into effect on 1 July 2005, giving rise to 
heightened discussion about the state of civil society in Russia. The discussion 
with the most significant ramifications emanates from the Kremlin itself. At a 
meeting of the Council for Facilitating the Development of Civil Society 
Institutions and Human Rights on 20 July, Putin brought up the issue of Western 
funding to Russian NGOs. His comments demonstrated characteristic perception 
on his part, although perhaps unintentionally. "I am categorically against the 
foreign financing of [NGOs'] political activities in Russia...We understand that he 
who pays the piper calls the tune," he said. (1)  That's why he went on to offer 
state funding to NGOs. "The grants that our organizations of this kind [i.e., 
NGOs] receive, including from abroad, represent mere pennies, really, and we 
are ready to take steps to provide our own support. The only thing that worries 
me is that I would not want you to think that this would be some kind of 
dependence, some kind of bribery offered by the state. We are ready to work in 
this direction in consultation with you, if we can develop a mechanism for 
cooperation in this area." (2) 
 
Putin's remarks were met with frustration by some NGO representatives. 
Lyudmila Alekseyeva, the head of the Moscow Helsinki Group, participated in the 
20 July meeting with Putin and expressed her frustration both with being accused 
of being a Western lap-dog and with the potential consequences of accepting 
money from the state. "If we take money from the state for our work, how will we 
be able to say, for example, that state officials falsify results of elections.... If we 
wish to be independent from our state officials we have no choice but to take 
money from the West." (3)  
 
Putin's comments come just as the Public Chamber, a body that initially was 
proposed to allow more oversight of the state structures by civil society, is 
coming into effect. The Chamber is suspected by some activists and critics of 
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being a tool used by the state to demonstrate civic support and participation 
while, at the same time, curbing criticism by co-opting civil society groups into 
state structures. 
 
Nonetheless, the reaction of civic groups has not been entirely negative. 
Lyudmila Alekseyeva, whose Moscow Helsinki Group has stated that it will not be 
participating in the Public Chamber, dismissed the body as a means of 
controlling the state's actions, but thought it could be useful. According to 
Alekseyeva, for the social groups that join it, the Public Chamber will provide a 
channel of communication with officials. For her own organization, however, 
Alekseyeva seems to prefer the communication channels already in place. 
"There is nothing for rights activists to do there. We have the Council for 
Promoting the Development of the Institutions of a Civil Society and Human 
Rights under the Russian President and the Human Rights Commissioner," she 
said. (4) 
 
In his speech on 3 August to the representatives of the Presidential Consultative 
Bodies on the formation of the Public Chamber, Putin outlined his criteria for the 
42 members of the Chamber that he appoints. He stated that they should have 
"broad public support, personal authority and influence in society and in their 
professional circles." They should also be "prepared for work at expert level" and 
"as free as possible of political bias." (5) 
 
Putin evidently expects the Public Chamber to fit well within the scheme of 
Russia's "managed democracy." The Chamber "should not be like some kind of 
ministry for working with civil society, but should be one of the fundamental 
structures within civil society itself." (6)  In other words, civil society does not 
consist of self-organizing, autonomous groups of people that have coalesced 
around social or political interests, as commonly conceived in the West. Instead it 
is to be a group of people hand-picked by the state (or those close to the state) to 
serve as a symbol of public approval and support. 
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The unfolding process of establishing the Public Chamber demonstrates clearly 
the two-track trajectory of civil society development in Putin's Russia. On one 
side, state-initiated or state-influenced civic groups receive benefits from the 
government, including subsidized rent and other assistance. (This is likely one of 
the perks of belonging to the Public Chamber. According to a gazeta.ru article 
last December, only groups accredited by the Public Chamber will be eligible for 
state-sponsored grants.) (7)  It is members of these organizations (and other 
innocuous but well-respected members of society) that are likely to be selected 
by the president because he cannot afford to have vocal opposition in the Public 
Chamber. 
 
On the other side, independent civic organizations have developed outside of 
government influence; these groups conform more to the Western definition of 
civil society in terms of autonomy from the state. They include environmental 
groups, feminist organizations, and human rights activists. Many of them receive 
funding from Western-based foundations and are vulnerable to shifting 
emphases in the donor community, from seed grants to NGO resource centers, 
for example. Their focus, in part, is determined by the projects and initiatives that 
donors are interested in supporting. Because this funding provides their primary 
means of existence, many NGOs must adjust their activities accordingly. Some 
independent civic groups have refused to join the Public Chamber, including the 
human rights group Memorial, as well as Moscow Helsinki Group. 
 
Finding Russian-based funding for NGOs whose activities might provoke the 
state has become even more challenging since the arrest and conviction of 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a wealthy businessman with political aspirations whose 
company Yukos committed millions of dollars to civic organizations in the early 
portion of this decade.  The risk of criminal prosecution for businesses and 
individuals supporting controversial NGOs has made Western funding all the 
more critical in maintaining NGOs with opposition viewpoints. 
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Independent NGOs face the challenge of trying to make themselves heard in a 
society whose media have come under increasing state pressure. Ironically, 
Putin raised the issue of "the Chamber's interaction with the media, above all 
regarding public involvement in ensuring guarantees for freedom of speech and, 
of course, citizens' rights to freely disseminate and receive information" at the 3 
August meeting. (8)  His comments follow on the heels of the announcement by 
the Foreign Ministry on 2 August that the licenses for ABC journalists (mandatory 
for operating legally as a journalist in Russia) would not be renewed. The 
decision reflects displeasure with ABC's  broadcast of an interview on its 
television show Nightline. The segment featured Chechen terrorist Shamil 
Basayev, interviewed by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) journalist 
Andrew Babitsky. RFE/RL Mass Media Relations Director Donald Jensen told 
RIA-Novosti that the interview was conducted by Babitsky while he was on 
vacation in Russia, thereby abdicating any responsibility for his actions on the 
part of RFE/RL. He added, "RFE/RL has not used this material." (9) 
 
The refusal to renew the licenses of ABC journalists is a clear signal from 
Moscow about both press freedom and coverage of the "counter-terrorist 
operation" in Chechnya. Foreign media outlets have been much more willing to 
air unfavorable coverage of the Chechen war than the Russian domestic press 
and have constituted a primary means of access to Western governments by 
independent Russian NGOs. Clamping down on coverage of Russian affairs by 
Western media, particularly on the issue of Chechnya, will make it all the more 
difficult for human rights organizations to make their voices heard. The Public 
Chamber may provide access to state structures for compliant, state-influenced 
civic groups, but for those preferring to remain outside that system, the number 
of options for reaching both a domestic and international audience are rapidly 
shrinking. 
 
Source Notes: 
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(1) "Foreign-funded NGOS pry into Russian politics – Putin," Reuters, 21 Jul 05 
via Johnson's Russia List (JRL) # 9207.  
(2) "Introductory remarks at a meeting of the Council for Facilitating the 
Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights," 20 Jul 05, 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/07/20/1934_type82913_91633.shtml.  
(3) "Alekseev: We are tired of being called the lap-dogs of the West," Argumenty 
i Fakty, 27 Jul 05 via JRL #9211. 
(4) "Russian civil society watchdog must be apolitical: Putin," Agence France-
Presse, 3 Aug 05 via JRL #9216. 
(5) "Introductory remarks at a meeting with Representatives of the Presidential 
Consultative Bodies on the Formation of the Public Chamber," 3 Aug 05, 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/08/03/1801_type82913_92099.shtml.  
(6) Ibid. 
(7) "Russian civil society watchdog must be apolitical: Putin," Agence France-
Presse, 3 Aug 05 via JRL #9216. 
(8) "Introductory remarks at a meeting with Representatives of the Presidential 
Consultative Bodies on the Formation of the Public Chamber," 3 Aug 05, 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/08/03/1801_type82913_92099.shtml. 
(9) "Radio Liberty says correspondent interviewed Basayev while on vacation," 
RIA Novosti, 3 Aug 05 via JRL #9216. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Marcel LeBlanc 
 
Lessons Learned from Priz 
Kremlin officials claim last week’s rescue of the mini-submarine Priz (designated 
AS-28) and its seven member crewwas the direct result of lessons learned during 
the Kursk disaster of August 2000.  Specifically, in handling the Priz incident, 
officials cite their willingness to seek foreign assistance—in this case British, 
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U.S., and Japanese equipment and personnel—as a sign of a fundamental 
mindset shift among Russian military leaders.  Although help did arrive in time to 
save Priz and her crew, analysis of this near-tragedy suggests Russian leaders 
did not learn as much from Kursk as they contend. 
 
Contrasts from Kursk  
Russian military accidents, specifically those involving submarines, inevitably will 
be compared to Kursk.  In happy contrast to that disaster, everyone on board the 
Priz was rescued and the mini-sub was recovered largely undamaged.  The 
direct result of an international rescue effort—one for which Russian Defense 
Minister Sergei Ivanov expressed “deepest gratitude”—this success significantly 
involved three of Russia's former military rivals using Western equipment and 
personnel, in cooperation with the Russian fleet, to rescue a Russian asset. (1)  
What changed in the ensuing five years following the Kursk to make 
commanders so much more willing to seek help?  Perhaps less than appears on 
the surface.  The Priz, unlike the Kursk, was not a nuclear-powered, flagship-of-
the-fleet submarine.  It had only a seven member crew, was only 44 feet long 
and was not a “tactical” submarine.  Also, not to be overlooked is the benign 
nature of Priz’s accident.  Entanglement in fishing nets or an underwater acoustic 
array (the story varies from source to source) does not raise the same thorny 
issues as was the case with the Kursk's undetermined on-board explosion. (2)  
After being freed by Britain’s remotely operated submersible Scorpio, Priz 
surfaced under its own power, allowing a number of Russian officials to avoid 
questions about the training and maintenance of Russia’s once-vaunted fleet.  All 
of these factors made the decision to ask for help in 2005 undoubtedly easier 
and more viable than in 2000. 
 
Similarities to Kursk  
Happily for the crew of AS-28, events transpired in their favor, even though all 
indications during the first half of their ordeal suggested otherwise.  In chilling 
similarity to Kursk, the official position taken following initial reports of Priz’s 
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troubles was to disavow any such incident. (3)  The Russian leaders followed this 
position with claims they had “no comment,” a position that evolved into a desire 
to avoid “interfering” with the rescue.  Finally, President Putin dispatched 
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov to “direct” the rescue efforts.  He nearly missed 
the actual rescue.  (4)  There are even claims by Radio 3 journalists in the port 
city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski that a phone call to their station forced 
Russians officials to acknowledge that AS-28 was in trouble. (5)  If this is true, it 
seems only a phone call prevented the Priz from meeting a fate similar to the 
Kursk.  
             
Much like the Fall of 2000, military and political leaders are grappling with what 
should be objective details surrounding the mini-sub’s rescue.  This inability to 
get their collective facts straight will prevent the self-evaluation necessary to 
avoid another serious event.  For example, questions still abound surrounding 
the amount of oxygen on board Priz after her crew was rescued—an important 
detail in evaluating how critical the situation had become before officials asked 
for help.  Also to be determined is just what snagged the AS-28, fishing nets or 
underwater cables the Russian Navy had placed on the sea floor.  This is an 
important factor in determining whether Priz’s crew was properly trained and 
equipped for the mission or just unlucky.  Most importantly, why did the Russians 
fail to provide rescue equipment of their own?  In post-rescue interviews, 
Defense Minister Ivanov claimed that logistically it was more feasible to fly the 
British Scorpio to Kamchatka than the Russian Venom (Russian submersible 
similar to Scorpio). (6)  This statement is grimly amusing considering that Scorpio 
was flown from Scotland to Kamchatka, and it conflicts with statements from 
Russian admirals (both active and retired) who claim either that Russia has no 
such capability or that it lacks the personnel to operate equipment of this kind.  
This glaring discrepancy could spell disaster for future submariners who find 
themselves in peril. 
 
The Road Ahead 
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The Kremlin’s official call for help in rescuing Priz and its crew undoubtedly was 
correct and, obviously, timely.  However, some stark contrasts from—and 
surprising similarities to—the Kursk tragedy of August 2000 point to far less 
institutional change than has been heralded by the same officials.  In this light, 
calls for procedural reform to prevent future accidents and promises for technical 
upgrades to rescue crews if accidents do happen, ring hollow. (7)  More 
importantly, an inability for honest, self-critical analysis in the highest echelons of 
the military will affect morale at the deck plates and will almost guarantee another 
disaster in the future.  Given its complex technical nature and training-intensive 
environment, the submarine force seems the most likely candidate for such a 
mishap. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) “Officials Praise British Navy, International Response after Mini-sub Crew is 
Rescued,” RIA-Novosti, 8 Aug 05 via Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 
Vol. 9, No. 148, Part I. 
(2) Vladimir Isachenkov, "Rescued Sailors Were Running Low on Oxygen," 
Associated Press, 8 Aug 05 via Johnson's Russia List (JRL) #9219. 
(3) “Putin’s Sinking Presidency: What Efficiency?” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 8 Aug 
05 Vol. 2, Is. 154. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) "Whistleblower broke secret of Russian sub and 'saved men's lives'," Agence 
France Presse, 9 Aug 05 via JRL #9220. 
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JRL #9219. 
(7) “Criminal Probe of Mini-Sub Accident Begins,” Associated Press, 9 Aug 05 via 
JRL #9220. 
 
 
 22 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
BELARUS 
Lukashenka prepares for presidential election 
On 27 July, Belarusian Police and OMON forces stormed and seized the Hrodna 
headquarters of the Union of Poles in Belarus (SPB).  SPB Chair Andzelika 
Borys told Radio Free Europe (RFE), “The police and OMON forces, carrying 
weapons, broke into the building…. They began to demand that members of the 
Union of Poles, who were inside, leave the building.  People were indignant.  
There were about 20 of us.  On what basis was the order issued?  Why were the 
police there?  Why was the OMON there?  Without any explanation, they began 
to throw people out by force.”  (1)  
 
Authorities detained and questioned those who had been inside the headquarters 
for a number of hours, after which time they were released.  No explanation for 
the action was provided.  However, the reason behind the attack could not be 
more clear.  The decision by Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenka to 
attack the SPB points to a frightening willingness to do whatever is necessary to 
hold onto power through next year’s presidential election.   The SPB is naturally 
a prime Lukashenka target, given that it is the largest non-governmental 
organization in Belarus, and that it receives partial funding from Poland.  
However, the attack also demonstrates the significant effect of the Georgian and 
Ukrainian “color” revolutions on the leadership of other post-Soviet states, and 
underscores Russia’s continuing support for Lukashenka’s policies.  
 
According to Andzelika Borys, the Union of Poles in Belarus maintains an “active 
membership” of 10,000 ethnically-Polish Belarusians, but claims to represent all 
400,000 ethnic Poles in the country.  It is widely said to be the most active 
independent association in Belarus, focusing on Polish language education, 
lobbying for the rights of minorities, and – most disturbing to the authorities – 
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attempting to provide Belarusian citizens with independent news from Poland.  
The group also apparently serves as an informal center for journalists writing 
about events in Belarus.  At the time of the raid on SPB headquarters, there were 
ten Belarusian and Polish journalists inside, reporting for Gazeta Wyborcza, the 
Associated Press, Glos Znad Ziemma, Nasha Niva, Pressbol and the online 
www.Pahonia.Promedia.  (2)  
 
In recent months, the organization has become more vocal in its criticism of 
Belarusian authorities and more independent in its activities – two things not 
tolerated by Lukashenka.  In particular, when SPB members elected new 
leadership early this year, they ignored an informal requirement that NGOs within 
Belarus receive approval of their leadership.  Instead, the group publicly elected 
new management – led by Borys – during a national congress in March.  
 
The Belarusian Justice Ministry reacted negatively to the election of a leadership 
unconnected to (or unco-opted by) the government, but took no immediate steps 
against the group.   
 
However, on the morning of 12 May, Belarus’ big brother entered the fray.  
Russian FSB Director Nikolai Patrushev lashed out at foreign international 
organizations and claimed that a summit had been held in Slovakia where “the 
possibility of continuing ‘velvet revolutions’ on the post-Soviet space was 
discussed.”  Moreover, he claimed that “various non-governmental organizations” 
were being used for this purpose, and that $5 million had already been allocated 
“to finance opposition movements in Belarus.” (3) 
 
Belarusian authorities fell into line.  The Belarusian Justice Department 
announced that the election of SPB’s new leadership over two months earlier 
was flawed, and that “the rulings of the 6th convention [of the SPB] are annulled.”  
(5)  The authorities also began threatened to detain members of the organization.  
In response, journalist and SPB spokesman Andrej Pachobut said, “By all 
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means, we shall defend the right to determine the public life of the Poles in 
Belarus independently.”  (6)  The stage for confrontation was set. 
 
Soon after, both Belarus and Poland expelled several diplomats each.  The spat 
also increased already tense relations between Russia and Poland, with the 
latter accusing Russia of supporting Belarus’ authoritarian policies.    
Rzeczpospolita wrote, “The issue:  Ukraine today, and Belarus in the future. 
Russia wants to maintain these countries within its exclusive sphere of influence. 
Poland, in turn, sees Ukraine as a member of the E.U. in a foreseeable future, 
and sees other post-Soviet states - Georgia, perhaps Moldova, and definitely 
post-Lukashenka Belarus - in close relations with Europe. These two strategies 
cannot be reconciled.” (7) 
 
Tensions increased significantly in June when an outspoken member of SPB was 
killed in Minsk in what was described as “a brutal knife attack.”  Spokesman 
Pachobut said that Jusefa Varaska’s death followed accusations on Belarusian 
television that the SPB had been given millions of dollars by NATO to use in anti-
governmental activity.  He said it also came in the midst of continued harassment 
of SPB members.  (8)  Not surprisingly, no arrests have been made in the case. 
 
In the days following the OMON raid on SPB, both the E.U. and U.S. issued 
statements of condemnation.  In particular, the E.U. said the raid demonstrates 
“once again the systematic and increasing repression of civil society, the political 
opposition and the independent media.” (9)  Poland also released its own much 
harsher statement and called on the E.U. to take concrete steps against Belarus.  
“The E.U. should take decisive and coordinated steps to urge the Belarusian 
regime to respect human and national minority rights, international law and 
bilateral treaties,” the Foreign Minister said.  (10)  
 
E.U. and Polish diplomats also attempted to secure a commitment from Russian 
President Vladimir Putin to discuss the issue with Lukashenka.  The efforts 
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appeared to be to no avail – a predictable result, given past experience.  In mid-
July, Poland had also prevailed upon Putin to discuss the harassment of the SPB 
during a summit between the two held in Zavidovo, Russia.  Putin instead chose 
to stand next to Lukashenka, shaking hands in a photo opportunity relished by 
the beleaguered Belarusian president.  Lukashenka said, "I greatly value such 
support, particularly in the sense of developing positive personal relations."  (11) 
 
Buoyed by Russia’s support, Lukashenka and his allies remain defiant in the face 
of international condemnation.  The latest foreign ministry response harkened 
back to previous claims of inappropriate interference in Belarus.  “The unilateral 
and politicized approach of evaluating the situation in Belarus confirms [their] aim 
to change the independent course of the Belarusian state,” it said. (12)  The 
ministry also summoned the Ukrainian and Moldovan ambassadors to express its 
“dissatisfaction” that Ukraine and Moldova had joined the E.U. statement 
criticizing Belarus.  Lukashenka showed no sign of backing down. (13) 
 
Although no SPB members were arrested on the night of the police raid, SPB 
members and journalists from Poland have been under increased attack by 
security services in the last two weeks.  
 
Pachobut and SPB newspaper editor Andrzej Pisalnik were arrested in late July 
and will serve 10-15 days in jail.  Two journalists representing Poland’s most 
popular newspaper, Gazeta Wyborcza, and a reporter for Polish TVP1 also were 
briefly arrested on the way to cover Pachobut’s trial.  Several days ago, a Polish 
photojournalist was removed from a train and detained when attempting to return 
to Poland. (14)   And most disturbingly, on 3 August, Veslaw Kewlyak, the deputy 
head of SPB, was jailed for 15 days.  His crime?  Meeting with the deputy 
speaker of the Polish Sejm. “A Sejm deputy has arrived in Hrodna today without 
notifying the Belarusian authorities and under the protection of a diplomatic 
passport.  He held a meeting with the illegitimate leadership of the Union of Poles 
in Belarus,” Belarusian State TV announced indignantly. (15) 
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These latest arrests follow the arrests of most of Lukashenka’s political 
opponents – decimating the ranks of potential “democratic” successors.  At this 
time, six major opposition figures sit in prison, usually jailed for holding 
unauthorized gatherings or slandering the president.  The majority of these 
leaders, including ex-Foreign Minister Mihail Marinich, leader of the Narodnaya 
Gramada Party Mikalay Statkevich, and MPs Andrey Klimau and Sierhay 
Skerbets had been seen as possible challengers to Lukashenka in the election.   
It is not surprising, then, that most have sentences miraculously set to end not 
long after the September election.  Still, their fates are better than some of their 
colleagues who simply disappeared. 
 
Following these latest incidents, an excerpt of a recent letter from political 
prisoner Skrebets to the new leader of the Narodnaya Gramada – himself facing 
increased persecution – seems particularly relevant.  “I hope that freedom and 
democracy will win in our country soon,” he said.  “It’s a question of time, but only 
for those who deserve freedom, who are ready to fight for it.  I am ready for that, 
and you should hold on, too.” (16) 
 
Source Notes: 
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(6) Ibid.  
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(8) ISN Security Watch, 29 Jun 05 via www.date.minsk.by. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Update: Succession Act II?  
Nursultan Nazarbaev's second term as Kazakh President officially expires in 
January 2006. At this point in time, new Presidential polls are slated for 
December 2005. Due, in part, to their massive defeat in last September's 
elections, Kazakhstan's opposition parties held discussions last spring aimed at 
agreeing on a joint candidate who would face Nazarbaev in the elections. (1)  
The eventual choice of the opposition groups was Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, former 
speaker of the Majlis and Deputy Chairman of Nazarbaev's Otan Party. Tuyakbai 
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had resigned in the immediate aftermath of the Parliamentary elections, citing 
massive electoral violations by Nazarbaev loyalists. In a straightforward interview 
with Nezavisimaya gazeta, Tuyakbai claimed that Kazakhstan's opposition had 
strong links with "the west" and with "international organizations," and would be 
receiving support from them in the pre-election period. He also revealed that 
another opposition leader, Bolat Abilov, had traveled to Kiev to observe the 
"Orange Revolution." (2)  Finally, Tuyakbai warned that Nazarbaev would use 
force to maintain his grip on power if necessary. (3) 
 
In terms of domestic policy, Nazarbaev's concerns about revolution must be 
viewed as unfounded: he has succeeded in neutralizing opponents, and in 
contrast to neighboring Kyrgyzstan, there were no mass protests after 
September's elections, despite the fact that they were widely viewed as 
fraudulent. Instead Nazarbaev fears that the role (or perceived role) of Western 
NGO's in fermenting events in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan might be 
reprised in Kazakhstan.  Nazarbaev has stated that the revolution in neighboring 
Kyrgyzstan was made possible only due to then President Askar Akaev's 
"weakness," (4)  a statement that can only be read as a threat to use force, if 
necessary. Taken together with events in the aforementioned countries, 
Tuyakbai's statements about foreign support for the opposition have given the 
President cause for action. 
 
In early June, deputies loyal to Nazarbaev introduced a bill to the floor of the 
Majlis which would "severely hobble" the work of NGO's operating in Kazakhstan. 
(5)  Open admissions have been made by deputies that the law is designed to 
defend the country against "pseudo revolutions." (6)  If ratified, the bill would do 
several things: first, all NGO's would be forced to re-register prior to Presidential 
polls. Secondly, all NGO funding including monies from foreign sources would 
have be approved by the Kazakh government, and thirdly NGO's would be forced 
to disclose their expenditures to the government fully, and could be shut down if 
their operations were viewed as "working against" the regime. (7)  
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At the time of writing, the bill has passed both Kazakhstan's upper and lower 
chambers, and has been sent by President Nazarbaev before the country's 
Constitutional Council, which has yet to reach a decision. In an interesting 
development, Nazarbaev's daughter Dariga, and her political party Asar have 
issued a direct appeal to the President, asking that the law be vetoed. Asar's 
appeal to Nazarbaev claims that the laws will "negatively affect what has been 
achieved by thousands of non-governmental organizations in partnership with the 
executive and representative bodies during the last decade." (8)  
     
As a result of Asar's performance in 2004's Parliamentary elections, Dariga 
Nazarbaeva is in line to succeed her father. Her position begs the question as to 
why Asar has reacted to the NGO bill in this manner. Given the Majlis' status as a 
"puppet body," this bill almost certainly was proposed and designed by 
Nazarbaev himself. A glance at Nazarbaeva's history reveals that Asar's 
statement may be Act II of a political game for her benefit.  
    
In the run up to last September's Parliamentary elections, Nazarbaeva was 
directly critical of Otan, stating that the party was guilty of "bullying" and vote 
rigging throughout the electoral process. (9)  Her outbursts were designed 
primarily to bolster her domestic public image as a first step toward the 
Presidency. Given President Nazarbaev's fears of foreign interference, it seems 
likely that the bill will be upheld and written into law before December's election. 
On this occasion, Asar's statement clearly is designed to position Nazarbaeva as 
a virtuous 'democrat' in the eyes of the West, and to curry the favor and support 
of foreign NGO's and governments, hopefully preempting international opposition 
to her accession. 
 
Kyrgyzstan & Uzbekistan  
U.S. bases: In or out? 
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A month ago, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) convened in 
Kazakhstan. A joint declaration issued by the leaders of the member countries 
called for U.S. forces to be removed from the region as soon as possible. (10)  
The declaration noted that since the "anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan" had 
been completed, stationing troops in the region no longer constituted strategic 
necessity. (11)  
   
It rapidly became clear that the joint declaration by the SCO leaders could not be 
taken as entirely representative: Since early July, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan 
have taken very different positions on the issue of basing. It is rumored that 
President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan was the primary force behind the SCO 
declaration, which constituted his response to U.S. pressure for an enquiry into 
the Andijan rebellion. (12)  The newly-elected Kyrgyz government at the time 
stated only that it required "clarification" on a timetable for withdrawal from the 
United States, while its Foreign Minister, Roza Otunbayeva noted that 
Kyrgyzstan wished to strengthen its ties with the U.S.. (13)  
    
In the weeks since the SCO summit, the Uzbek position has remained 
intractable. The government controlled Uzbek media has mounted a series of 
attacks against the U.S. and its policies, portraying Washington as imperialist, 
and stating that "Uzbekistan plays an active role in the international war on 
terror…However, when Uzbekistan faced terrorist aggression," foreign 
governments failed to "provide any help, even moral support. On the contrary, 
they distort the events [of Andijan] and libel our country." (14)  
    
On 29 July, the Uzbek government delivered a note to the U.S. Embassy in 
Tashkent, renouncing the basing agreement for Karshi-Khanabad (K2), which 
currently houses approximately 1,000 U.S. Troops. The Uzbek government 
reportedly has given the U.S. 180 days—six months—to close the facility. (15)  
At this point in time, Uzbekistan's policy apparently extends only to the U.S. 
presence in the country. Notably, the German government has not yet been 
 31 
asked to remove the 300 strong Bundeswehr contingent which is based at 
Termez, some 150 miles South-East of K2. (16) As such, the Uzbek 
government's position should be viewed first as reaction to a perceived 'betrayal' 
of Tashkent by Washington, and second as part of a long-standing desire on the 
part of President Karimov to remove a potentially 'meddlesome' foreign 
presence—perceived as a threat to his position—from the country.  
    
President Kurmanbek Bakiev and the new government of Kyrgyzstan have 
proved more responsive to U.S. diplomacy. On 25 July, Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld arrived in Bishkek for a series of talks with Kyrgyz officials. The 
result of these discussions with Bakiev, Prime Minister-in-waiting Feliks Kulov, 
and acting Defense Minister Ismail Isakov on 26 and 27 July was an apparent 
pledge that U.S. forces can remain at their Manas and Ganci airbases in 
Kyrgyzstan "until the situation" in Afghanistan "has improved." (17)  Once 
Afghanistan is no longer a "hotbed of tension…and source of terrorism," (18)  
basing agreements will be revisited. Talks between Rumsfeld and Kyrgyz officials 
also apparently resulted in a $200 million interest-free loan to develop the 
infrastructure at Manas, (19)  as well as agreements to develop closer 
exchanges on "defense technology" issues. (20)  In hindsight, it is obvious that 
the Kyrgyz request for "clarification" in the aftermath of 10 July elections 
represented little more than the opening move in an ultimately successful 
bargaining game, designed to gain as much as possible from the U.S. in return 
for continued basing rights.  
 
Source Notes: 
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(3) Ibid.  
(4) Ibid.  
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